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THREE CRITICAL FACTORS IN THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY: 
PRODUCT, PROCESS AND PERSONNEL 
(THE 3P PROJECT) 
 
IONEL NIŢU 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
3P derives from the three very important categories / areas in defining a reform process of 
the national security intelligence analysis, namely: 
– Process (the analysis activity, with his entire set of methods or means, internal 
procedures and standards, but also, with its various types of organization); 
– Product (the results of the analysis activity, the products which are sent to beneficiaries 
/ users and the feedback or the requests for information from the intelligence consumers); 
– Personnel (the intelligence analyst, as well as the process of its selection and training). 
Why these three P? I must confess that the idea of trying to define the analysis activity, 
and implicitly, the main parts of a reform in this important area for the activity of each 
intelligence service came following some discussions I had with colleagues, experts and 
intelligence analysts. I worked, as co-author, to a paper (presented within an international forum) 
concerning the evolution of intelligence analysis on these three categories: process, product and 
personnel. Afterward, I found there is a whole literature that defines the management processes 
(especially in corporations) or the performance in an organization / company in the 3P logic. 
So, I will briefly approach, from a theoretical point of view, the subject of intelligence analysis 
reform, and I will talk about practical component, starting from those three identified essential factors. 
Keywords: intelligence, intelligence analysis, national security, security culture, analytical 
culture, the 3P Project. 
 
 
Theoretical Premises 
 
The security risks’ dynamics after the end of the Cold War is one of the 
research topics in the international relations, as well as in subsequent areas of 
the security studies and intelligence analysis. Among the most known authors 
that treat the subjects of globalization and widening the security concept there 
are James Rosenau, Alvin Toffler1, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 
complex interdependences theories or Ikenberry regarding the security strategies2.  
                                                          
1
  Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, Random House, New York, 1970. 
2
  John Baylis, Steve Smith, The Globalisation of World Politics. An Introduction to 
International Relations, Oxford, University Press, Oxford, 2001.  
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The changes in the national security area were widely treated both within 
the organizational theories and the rational choose theory (Cummings3, 
Mullins4), as well as in international relations theories (starting from the 
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikov study on Cuban missile crisis5) or in the 
psychological studies (regarding the change – Carnall, Burke6). 
The approaches concerning the change into intelligence analysis are 
mostly of English origin and are limited to debates on reform of security area 
and inter-agency cooperation. In this field, there are very famous the studies of 
„The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces” (DCAF Centre, Geneva) or 
„Kings College”, London, or „RAND Corporation, in US, as well as those on policies’ 
analysis carried out in an institutional framework (the analysis of the Parliamentary 
commissions post September 11 or Treverton’s7 and Barger’s8 studies). 
The first scientific concerns (within US intelligence community) belong 
to Sherman Kent (whose name was given to the most famous research institute 
in this field, Centre for Intelligence Studies, CIA) and Richard Heuer jr9. 
The researches on intelligence analysis have been started after the end of 
the Second World War along with the development of the analytical domain 
within CIA. 
Gradually, but in a pronounced way in the recent years (in the September 11 
period) intelligence specialization (SIGINT, OSINT, HUMINT, etc) and 
technological development led to the some intelligence studies focused on 
special fields (secrete sources, use of satellites, combating terrorism and 
organized crime etc.), but offered a less comprehensive perspective over the 
entire process reform of intelligence analysis. 
There have been advanced researches on the developments in the 
intelligence area, which has been generated by security systems’ reforms and 
the assessments produced within different intelligence services in Europe and 
US, as well as by the development of cooperation between services within 
NATO and EU. 
Nowadays, most of the studies concerning the intelligence area have been 
generated by the emergence, after the end of the Cold War, of some national 
                                                          
3
  T. G. Cummings, E. F. Huse, Organizational Development and Change, West, St. Paul 
Minn, 1989. 
4
  L. J. Mullins, Management and Organizational Behavior, Pitman Publishing, London, 1989. 
5
  Graham Allison, Philip Zelikov, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Addison Wesley, Logman, Inc., New York, 1999. 
6
  C. A. Carnall, Managing Change in Organisations, Prentice Hall International, New York, 
1990; W. W. Burke, Organization Change. Theory and Practice, 2nd Ed. Sage Publications, 2008. 
7
  Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. 
8
  Deborah G. Barger, Towards a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs, www.rand.org 
9
  Richards J. Heuer Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999. 
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intelligence communities (in US, Great Britain etc) having the role to harmonize 
the objectives of intelligence services and to integrate the collected intelligence. 
These communities have been passing through a process of fundamental changes 
with impact on every component structure, but they have achieved, in time, their 
own logic of institutional development which involves transformation processes 
which differs from the individual ones - of the intelligence agencies.  
Other relevant bibliography sources are the professional articles published 
in various American and European magazines, especially those in the area of 
intelligence and intelligence analysis, concerning the fails and success of 
intelligence services in combating the new security threats or managing the 
“classic” ones. The Parliamentary commissions established in last years 
(especially after September 11) for assessing the activity of important 
intelligence services, have revealed the existence of various dysfunctions which 
favored the appearance of “analysis failures”. In this context, the need for 
reforming those systems, on several levels, has become imperative. 
In US, the report of commission which investigated the activity of 
intelligence services after September 11 revealed the existence of shortcomings 
in ensuring the flows of intelligence and mistakes in assessing the available data 
(minimizing / ignoring the risk or, by contrary, exaggerating it). 
With respect to the reform of intelligence analysis intelligence within 
Romanian intelligence community, there haven’t been yet developed researches 
or studies dealing with this subject in a unitary and comprehensive way.  
 
 
Elements That Involve the Necessity of Change 
 
Basically, re-conceptualization process of the intelligence paradigm was 
influenced by the activity of several exogenous and endogenous factors.  
● Among the main internal factors, inducing changes in intelligence field 
there are: 
a) the major changes in legislation or national security strategies – as well 
as those generated by September 11 terrorist attack. 
In the last decade, many states updated its doctrines, policies, strategies 
and legislations on security intelligence and started the reform of security 
domain (including intelligence) by pursuing specific goals and purposes: 
– clarifying and developing the concepts within this domain; 
– unequivocally defining the elements representing the condition for 
national security; 
– settling the general consensus on the aimed goals and the involved 
tools for ensuring or promoting the national security interests; 
– improving the architecture of national intelligence system accordingly 
to security challenges; 
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b) relevant adjustments of institutions’ s budgets as a result of transformation 
of institutional priorities and the personnel decrease 10; 
c) beginning the major reform process after the end of Second World war 
and after that, the September 11; 
d) rising the need to extend the cooperation (at national and especially, 
international level); 
e) modifying the internal requirements of intelligence agencies (both pursuant 
to modifying the national legislations and the need to adapt to the new challenges); 
f) rising the needs on recruiting and guiding the personnel, modifying the 
organizational culture and the methods and procedures; 
In some cases the changes occurred within intelligence domain have been 
generated by: 
– leakage of classified information or discover the targets, methods etc. 
which have generated legislative investigations or public opinion’s pressures; 
– intelligence failures (not necessarily those which become public); 
– changes of political system or certain governmental politics or 
decisions (including those of decrease of bureaucracy system); 
– the dynamics of internal relationships (cooperation protocols) or 
external (for example Club of Berne implies adjustments of procedures 
or sometimes of structures); 
– changing the services’ leadership (every new leadership is tempted to 
impose its own perspective); 
– institutional necessities (concerning the flexibility and reduce of bureaucracy) 
● The most important exogenous determinations are posed by the 
complex and dynamic developments of the security environment, namely:  
a) enhancing the threats area and multiplication the sources with high 
potential risk – in the context of growing the number of the international actors 
(as a consequence of disintegration of some multinational States), growing the 
number of “fragile societies” / “weak States” and assuming an international and 
mainly regional active role by some emergent powers. I have in view those 
factors that started to shape the activity of intelligence structures:  
– proliferation of actors, conflict sources and type of force used; 
– cross-border character, enhancing the scope and the impact of threats; 
– technological progress caused by increasing the vulnerabilities of many 
different and disparate sources; 
– prominence of unconventional forms of conflict; 
– increasingly targeting violence toward the urban zone and internal 
security area, duplicate by social tensions generated by economic, 
ethnic, religious and ideologic conditions11. 
                                                          
10
  Graham Allison, Philip Zelikov, op. cit., pp. 145-147. 
11
  Gregory Treverton, The Next Step in Reshaping Intelligence, Rand Corporation, 2005. 
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b) emphasizing the globalization process – that generated, among others, 
the “explosion” of information (multiplication the sources of information) and 
enhancing the benefits of technical scientific progress – generated, also, the 
globalization of risks.  
We witness a diminishing of classical dichotomies intern-extern and 
politic-military as of the risks development on the States. Beyond the 
benefits derived from borders dissolution and growing competitiveness as a 
consequence of the structural changes, globalization – through phenomena that 
it generates – determines multiple tensional situations, demanding changes of 
the security environment.  
Division and integration, internationalization and regionalization, centralization 
and decentralization are several phenomena that create insecurity. Terrorism, 
organized crime, economic crisis, starvation, climatic changes are global.  
In the current social economic conditions, the unequal access to resources 
makes the difference between states and continues the conflicts inter-States. We 
witness an increasing of the natural disasters, reducing energy resources, 
demographic growing related with reducing water and food resources. These 
phenomena continue to affect the global stability and security. The present 
situation is the consequence of “breaking down” some States following a 
deficient governing, precarious economic conditions, maintaining ethnic 
religious conflicts, weakness of the local and regional co-operation forms, 
technological difference, etc.  
According to Dolghin, the fight for energy resources dominates the 
geo-politics of the XXI Century. The resources are “where is not necessary” and 
in the possession of “those who do not deserve them”12. 
The accelerated process of integration, interdependence and 
communication – usually, defined, through globalization –, appears as the most 
challenge to the national security system as well as to the States.  
Technical scientific progress, accelerated rhythms of IT&C development 
and diversifying the types of information war have enhanced the perspectives 
and scope of the planning in the national security institutions and have imposed 
the necessity of strategic assessments. 
Transposed at level of intelligence structures, this situation imposed to 
overcome the intuitive forms of prevision based on suppositions and 
extrapolations and the heuristic ones (based on intuition, flair and creativity) 
and to develop early warning systems; 
c) the hardly predictable character of the new types of asymmetric and 
unconventional threats, comparing by the classical threats, focused on the 
State security.  
                                                          
12
  Nicolae Dolghin, Geopolitics. Dependence of Energy Resources, UNAp Publishing 
House, Bucharest, 2004. 
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Currently, the most important challenge that the international community 
face with is caused by the complexity of the new types of threats. These are 
difficult to identify, observe and interpret, considering that the security 
challenges differ from a country to another and from a social group to another. 
While the classical threats could be geographically localized (risks factors to the 
Nation-State), the new asymmetric threats could probable affect any zone.  
To anticipate and, probably, to shape the future, as well as to promote 
national security strategies / politics and to adopt decisions with major 
implications at state level are necessary certain and substantiated prognoses on a 
variety of domains: economic trends, from technologic development and 
climatic changes to diversification the forms of fighting (particularly, the 
atypical forms of conflict as the counterterrorism war).  
Getting intelligence and working out national security strategies imply, on 
long term, to establish the challenging domains and defining objectives. In line 
with this aspect, utility of the intelligence analysis (strategic prognosis) consist 
in the fact it could provide an advantage to that person who better knows 
requires of a future war, and timely draws the necessary conclusion for 
implementing them. 
In order to counteract the new types of risks and threats, intelligence 
services initiated processes both to change the acting component of the 
intelligence activity (enhanced competencies for the intelligence services in 
fields as energy security, food security, etc., determined an increasingly division 
and specializing of the analysis and collecting data activity) and to increase the 
role of analytical component (enhancing the anticipative and preventing component) 
in order to improve the capability of response to these new challenges.  
Increasingly more analysts noted that security is not only a military power 
issue but also an issue of access to intelligence, of understanding the critical role 
of complementarity between decision and intelligence. The focus is not targeted 
on combating any more, but on the activity of prevention. This determines a 
proportional increase of the role and real importance of the intelligence services. 
It is to be noted the fact that the global development of events formed an 
unknown issue as domain of study: the relationship between intelligence and 
security, where intelligence is the strategic resource of power; 
d) the non-operative developments (that is not necessary related with the 
dynamic of the risks and threats (as the technologic ones) to the security). IT & C 
developments are equally opportunities for modernizing services and also 
challenges (that could cause further risks and difficulties in monitoring risks); 
e) a direct (arming a hostile neighboring country, war) or imminent 
(environment, health) threat;  
f) joining to regional politic / military, economic organizations (e.g. NATO 
and UE) that imposes new standards, institutionalizes some forms of cooperation 
(that determines structural reorganization, new objectives and missions etc.). 
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 Usually, the changing in intelligence services is an outcome of 
simultaneous action of exogenous and endogenous factors.  
 
 
Praxiological Guiding Marks to Underline the Changing in 
Intelligence Activity 
 
● The reality showed that their changing is mainly a reactive process that 
occurs when a inflection strategic point is reached, beyond which the current 
procedures (“business as usual”) could not efficiently work any more. 
For a really changing in the intelligence field, there are necessary an 
enhanced strategy of transforming, a new doctrinal framework, a rapid adjusting 
and “continuous learning” system and, in a perspective not so far, transforming 
the national security system in an intelligence service focused on network (through 
interconnecting the intelligence platforms of the component structures, disseminating 
them for analyzing multi-sources, conducting operations in cooperation).  
As an argument, it is to be noting that after 2011 9/11, the reform in 
intelligence field in the majority of the Western countries generated two 
significant developments: 
– at the operational level, developing some intelligence “fusion” 
capabilities, to integrate data held by different governmental bodies; 
– at the strategic level, developing the national intelligence community, 
as well as the international cooperation, in formats bi and multilateral 
(with noticeable outcomes, explicitly mentioned for growing the 
common potential to prevent and counteract the security risks, 
accommodating the actionable procedures, etc.).  
Among the most imperative needs to efficiently manage the current and 
future risks are the enhancing the national and international cooperation. 
● Within the process of changing the intelligence analysis (regardless its 
level of profoundness or the fact it is revolutionary or, on the contrary, 
evolutionary) is very important to establish and, subsequently, to monitor: 
– the necessities that impose changing (e.g.: modification of the national 
priorities and objectives after Romana’s joining to NATO and UE, 
changing the picture of risks and threats to the national security, etc., 
enhancing the cooperation with Euro-Atlantic services, and also with 
the other institutions in the national security system); 
– the principles and objectives targeted through the process of changing 
(e.g. defining and implementation of some scientific methods for 
intelligence analyzing and human resources management, growing the 
institutional flexibility, the quality of activity and the capacity of 
response to the challenges as well as the security opportunities, and the 
strengthening of the institutional profile); 
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– the achieved or foreseen outcomes, in every relevant component 
(structural, functional, ruling, resources management, internal and 
external relationship) and the effects on the component of the 
intelligence process. 
The intelligence reform cannot pursue anything but designing a more 
efficient and flexible organization, connected to the informational society, 
capable to rapidly react to the security challenges and to pro-actively follow its 
responsibilities, open to the public opinion, and functioning not only based on 
rules and procedures, but also adopting new attitudes and mentalities.  
● From a practitioner’s perspective, among the main drivers of change 
one could mention: 
– the detailed planning of change stages and the thorough preparation of 
their launching; 
– the consultation of the organization members since the first stages of 
change planning together with the permanent communication with 
them, with the purpose of informing the members on the stage 
objectives and results, as well as on the corrections needed; 
– the acceptance and the undertaking of the expected decisions, as well as 
the exact understanding, by each member, of his / her role within the system; 
– the alteration not only of the objectives, tasks, structure and 
organization but also of the essential features of the organizational 
culture and mentalities, impacting both the internal environment, as 
well as the relations with the external environment. 
The success of the transformation decisively depends on the people 
working for the intelligence agencies, on their quality, authority and 
determination to take over the role of main internal agents of change. However, 
the success is also the result of the external agents contribution (decision-
makers, partner services, etc.), as well as of the people involved in modeling the 
change (consultants or specialists).  
The approach on the change in the intelligence domain must have as 
starting point intelligence imperatives analysis after the Cold War and taking 
into account 9/11 events, which lead to the identification of multiple 
deficiencies at the level of the intelligence communities. Among the 
deficiencies, one could mention the lack of joint standards and practices for the 
internal and external structures, the reduced capacity to establish the priorities 
and use the resources, the plenty of tasks, the complex organization and 
functioning of the intelligence work, the extreme secrecy and the structural 
barriers for cooperation. 
We must also equally take into account the intrinsic features of the 
intelligence services (the conservatism, the specific hierarchy, the security 
agenda etc.), as well as the new requests for them, stemming from the 
significant shifts in the security environment, the technological boom, and 
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customers needs and expectations regarding the accuracy of predictions and the 
control of unexpected developments. 
 
 
Why 3P? 
 
Starting with the previously mentioned considerations and the day-to-day 
activity assessments within an intelligence analysis department we could 
consider that the three Ps are becoming crucial factors in the reform and 
modernization processes regarding the intelligence analysis within the 
intelligence communities and services. 
The need for an integrated approach of the three factors results from the 
fact they cannot be analyzed separately: 
– it is not feasible to solely improve the analytic process (for example by 
implementing new scientific methods for analysis, creating new 
working methodologies or extending the cooperation with the 
academia), in the absence of professional analysts. The improvement of 
the analysis process cannot be an objective by itself if it doesn’t resides 
in the augmentation of the predictive dimension, as well as of the 
analytic products quality; 
– it is not desirable human resources training exclusively, in the absence 
of an increase in the quality of the analysis process and without the two 
above-mentioned objectives to be materialized in intelligence products 
improvement and diversification; 
– it cannot be achieved an increase in the quality of the analytic products, 
in order to meet the increasingly complex and diversified customers 
needs, in the absence of improving the other two factors: the analysis 
process and the personnel. 
 
 
● The First P – The Process 
 
As long as the intelligence work has as main purpose, generally speaking, 
to reduce consumers inherent – “natural” uncertainty, specific to the complex 
national security issues, as well as their induced uncertainty (by manipulation 
and disinformation operations), the analysis process is mainly oriented to 
transform the results of the intelligence work into a specific contribution to 
state’s and citizens security.  
 
From a functional perspective, intelligence analysis must have a pivotal 
role between national security intelligence collection and processing, and 
dissemination (information). 
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Any explicative model used in the intelligence studies starts with the 
intelligence cycle. The classical cycle implies certain logic, even a linear one: 
request / planning – collection – processing / analysis – dissemination. Analysts 
and managers from different intelligence agencies with significant traditions are 
proposing new versions of the classical intelligence cycle where, given the 
informational flood, the analysis is not only a part of the overall process, but a 
necessary input to every stage of the cycle. 
Therefore, in the launching stage of the intelligence process (the result of 
either a consumer request, or the internal planning process), the analysis should 
contribute to the orientation of intelligence collection, the precedence of the 
objectives etc. Within the collection stage, selecting the targets and risks to be 
monitored implies an analysis on the priorities of the state and the hierarchy of 
national security risks. Within the processing stage, the analysis becomes self-
referential when it has the objective to assess its own product (along a specific 
period, taking into account the ratio between the predictions and the effective 
developments etc.). Furthermore, while disseminated to the intelligence 
consumers, the analysis is playing a critical role regarding the shape and content 
of the intelligence product, the feed-back assessment, the identification of ways 
to consolidate the cooperation between the producer (analyst) and consumer 
(intelligence customer), and even regarding the development of a common 
language for them.  
 
From the methodological perspective, it is necessary to improve the 
analysis processes and products by continuously adapting the structure and the 
working methods, in a way that the final product to be obtained as fast as 
possible, at a high quality level and efficiently (cost-benefit ratio). 
In order to eliminate the situation where the intelligence analysis is failing 
due to the limits of the analytical process, a reform of intelligence analysis 
should envisage to: 
– theoretically (re)design the analysis domain, for creating new 
instruments for work standardization, and developing the methodology 
extensively (the increase in the number of research methods, including 
by implementing new methods and techniques used by private 
intelligence structures - benchmarking, reengineering, risk and strategic 
management, competitive intelligence etc. - as well as by enlarging 
their domain for applicability) and intensively (refining/perfecting the 
used research methods). There also could be extremely useful to import 
methods from other sciences, especially social sciences, applicable in 
the current intelligence work.  
The necessity of developing a conceptual apparatus for intelligence 
analysis is build on the concern regarding the elimination of the 
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confusions generated by the absence of consensus on the used / 
operable notions and concepts in intelligence analysis;  
– implement lessons learned mechanisms, in order to allow the inventory 
and sharing (even since the educational process) of the factors influencing 
analysis work (analysis errors, limits or deficiencies determined by 
some other factors, such as the psychological ones, the timelines etc.); 
– cross-disciplinary address the security problems / phenomena and 
elaborate multi-source analytical products; 
– value open / public sources, taking into account that the “open society” 
and the flood of available information is facilitating the use of 
“unclassified” methods in motivating and implementing the 
security policies; 
– focus the analysis work on the development of the capacities and 
capabilities needed for elaborating predictive / anticipative intelligence 
products, in order to allow vulnerabilities identification and the 
countering of the risks challenging national security; 
– push for the use of intuitive-predictive techniques (opportunities 
analysis, reduced probability assessment, scenario method, concurrent 
hypotheses analysis, conflicting decisions analysis – corresponding 
to the strategic intelligence) in order to meet customers requests 
and needs, focused on assessing the implications and emphasizing 
the uncertainties.  
I would support the idea regarding the need for a conceptual apparatus for 
intelligence analysis with Johnstons’s13 findings, who – after hundreds of 
interviews and multiple participations to US working teams, immediately after 
9/11 / didn’t identified any standard analytical method for intelligence analysis.  
The author is mentioning that “the most common practice is to conduct 
limited brainstorming on the basis of previous analysis, thus producing a bias 
toward confirming earlier views. [...] None of the analytic agencies knows much 
about the analytic techniques of the others. In all, there tends to be much more 
emphasis on writing and communication skills than on analytic methods. [...] 
Most training is on-the-job.” 14 
I think that as the operatives have to learn human sources approaching 
and recruiting techniques, the analysts have to know and use analysis methods. 
A particular importance for this complex approach, although a new 
concept within the domestic intelligence community, has the meta-analysis, 
which could also be called “the analysis of analysis”. From this perspective, the 
concept of meta-analysis designates: 
                                                          
13
  Johnston Rob, Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community. An Ethnographic 
Study, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC, 2005. 
14
  Ibidem, p. 3. 
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– on the one hand, the assessment – mainly in terms of efficiency / 
operatively – of the degree of harmonization between the methods and 
techniques employed during the analytical process and national 
security data and information to be processed with a view to elaborate 
intelligence products; 
– on the other hand, the complex theoretical approach meant to: identify 
the intimate mechanisms that define the analytical process specific to 
the intelligence area and to (re)configure the used conceptual and 
methodological instruments in order to improve analysis and prognosis 
by stimulating critical thinking. 
Johnston15 endorse the foundation of an “Improvement Performance 
Infrastructure”, able to measure the actual and ideal analytical performances, to 
compare them (in order to reveal the performance lacks), to intervene (with the 
aim of improving the analysis) and, subsequent, to measure once again the 
performance (to evaluate the efficacy of the interventions).  
 
From a structural point of view, the proper projection of the analytical 
levels’ attributions is essential for setting up networks of communication 
between the intelligence structures (gathering and analysis) and for establishing 
various efficient response mechanisms.  
The IT platforms have, from this perspective, a major role. They aim at 
facilitating the interaction (especially as far as the task-forces are concerned), 
improving the operability (in receiving and recognizing the value of the inputs 
used in elaborating the intelligence produces) as well as in augmenting the 
interaction between the analysis and intelligence gathering. 
 
 
● The Second „P” – The Personnel  
 
According to the “3P Project”, is indispensable to implement a functional 
model of professional training (as far as the intelligence analysis is concerned) 
having as priorities the training of: 
– new employed individuals; 
– trainers (given that they will have a major role in identifying the 
existing training needs as well as in upgrading the existing training programs). 
As far as the new employees are concerned, the selection of personnel 
and recruitment policies are essential. After their employment, their intense and 
staged training is indispensable.  
The training has to start from the premise that “what most people know 
about this job is mostly false. It is the duty of the organization and its recruiters 
                                                          
15
  Ibidem, p. 85. 
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to present its correct image and to work in order to destroy the already 
established myths”16. 
 
From a functional perspective, the imperative of developing the 
analytical capabilities (tactically and strategically) in order to identify the best 
methods for linking the existing capabilities to the priorities of national security 
is a fact. This is sine qua non goal for the intelligence agencies, most of which 
having various and extensive programs for training the individuals involved in 
the analytical activity.  
Modernizing this critical component of the analytical intelligence aim at 
identifying the needs of the analyst’s own needs of selection and professional 
development, within the framework of his/her career within an analytical department.  
The selection methods have to shift from a passive attitude (publishing 
the educational offer and taking any Resume or application into account) to an 
offensive one: selection on specialized websites, information campaigns in the 
Universities training the specialists the intelligence agencies need, taking part in 
job-related activities etc. For some posts (such as top posts) head hunting 
companies might help.  
 
From a structural perspective, it is important to have various 
psychological tests (starting with the selection process) focusing on the 
vocation-aptitudes. Also, professional tests (based on competences and 
knowledge) can support the recruitment process. Later on, work diagnoses 
might be extremely helpful, focusing on: the psycho-professional profile of the 
analyst (as well as on the features for shaping future generations of analysts) 
and the identification of the performance criteria (allowing the identification of 
significant elements in assuring the analysts’ efficiency as well as their 
activity’s evaluation criteria). 
Nonetheless, developing experience-exchange mechanisms (between 
various analytical departments and, also, between areas of intelligence gathering 
and analysis) and generalizing the good practices might contribute at optimizing 
the analytical process, broadening the analysts’ knowledge horizon and 
avoiding the errors as far as their shaping is concerned.  
 
From a relational perspective, is vital to have permanent exchanges of 
opinion, projections, experience etc. with similar structures within Western 
intelligence services as well as connections to academically research linked to 
the national security. Keeping the analysts updated with the realities of the 
security context as well as the fundamental researches in related fields 
(economy, international relationships, administrative studies etc.) make possible 
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IONEL NIŢU 90 
a proper understanding of the security evolutions they have to evaluate 
periodically. Attending scientific conferences, seminaries and round-tables keep 
the analysts’ minds open, allow them to have initiative and a pro-active attitude 
(in regards to their study object), to be creative and, in the same time, equally, 
to practice their critical approach. 
 
 “An analysis culture rooted in cooperation and interaction, on decisional 
relevance, implies automatically the development of a more subtle relationship between 
the various levels of the intelligence”17.  
 
From a cognitive perspective, given the inherent difficulties of 
processing complex information, analysts have to be encouraged to clearly 
separate the assumptions by deductions and to specify the degree and the 
incertitude source involved in the meta-analysis which periodically reexamines 
the key problems in the context. The analysts have to be stimulated to be 
innovative as well as rigorous, to use the analytical instruments (scientifically 
validated), to underline the methods presenting various view points and to 
present (in intelligence products for the decision-makers) not only the limits but 
also the virtues of analysis. 
 
From a managerial perspective, is important to create an organizational 
medium for stimulating the analysis and assuring the training in intelligence-
related analysis, focused on the endeavor to widen the analyst’s mental model. 
Given that the analyst has to estimate – based on the available information, 
his own experience and his own psychological abilities (intuition, creativity, 
imagination) – the evolution tendencies of the threat indicators or their emergence, 
there is a risk for the intelligence analysis to be limited by the mental human 
capabilities and to wear the burden of using “mental fixations” or “lens”18. 
The following are the reasons for which they have to be developed: 
– modern policies for the selection of the intelligence analysts (used by 
Euro-Atlantic Services) and for stimulating the performances 
(individual or teamwork); 
– programs (as diversified as possible) for the training of the analysts, by 
means of experience exchanges with other Services, connection to 
trends of scientifically research in expertise areas, attending seminaries 
and conferences as well as stimulation of individual permanent training. 
Work’s fulfillment is very important not only for gaining the optimal 
status in the performance of the analysts but also for limiting the numbers of 
resignations in the intelligence agencies. For these reasons, creating an optimal 
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working environment (based on meritocracy, able to stimulate the professional 
performances and the access to the management positions) is a must. The non-
provoked resignations – also known as “deserting”19 – have consequences both 
in keeping the secrecy of the classified information (known by the analysts) as 
well as in regards to the finances, given the high costs needed for the 
specialization of this special category of personnel20.  
 
 
● The Third P – The Product 
 
National security has a multidimensional character, requiring an integrated 
and interdisciplinary approach. Its accomplishment is possible only within the 
frameworks of the existence of suitable institutional mechanisms between the 
forces and the levers aiming at defending and promoting the national interests.  
Countering the actual complex threats implies the implementation of an 
integrated way of response, involving political, social, diplomatic, informational, 
military and other categories of elements. It requests: improvement of the 
relationships with the beneficiaries of national security information in order to 
have an efficient feed-back, capable of (re)orientate, subsequently, the intelligence 
activity; strengthening of the cooperation between the specialized structures within 
national security; opening communication and cooperation channels between 
the intelligence analysts and the academic scholars or researchers (having an 
expertise that might contribute to improving the analyses and assessments). 
 
From a methodological perspective, is becoming obvious the fact that, 
in the actual context, the activity of the institutions involved in assuring the 
security climate has to be organized in a manner which allows the analysis 
structures to adapt and to face the new provocations (prefigured by risks and 
threats’ extension, in regards to the national security). 
Given that the demands to inform the decision-makers are based on 
actionable intelligence (tactical analyses needed for taking specific decision in 
various areas) as well as on strategic intelligence (as a consequence of the complex 
evolutions in the security domain), in the process of reform of the intelligence 
analysis both analytical types (tactical and strategic) have to have an equal 
importance. The classical terminology might lead, in a first phase, to wrong 
conclusions: intelligence as analytical product is actionable in itself. One might 
choose a specific course of action or, on a strategic level, might determine (given 
the available evaluations) the advantages or disadvantages of a certain state policy, 
the assumed risks and the way that specific policy has impact over national security. 
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One of the unwanted effects of the relationship between the producer and 
the consumer of intelligence, the excessive-information, generates by default 
certain selection difficulties in the “news-ocean” of the data which reflects 
correctly a certain reality. The national security reality goes progressively from 
the black and white, concrete reality, to the area of perception, to images on the 
reality that various actors involved in security build. 
In comparison with these changing realities, the tactical intelligence can 
be an anchor, a substrate of reality, while the strategical intelligence is trying to 
make a prediction, a transversal vision of all layers of reality. From this point of 
view, both are vitals and reinforce each other. 
The failure analysis of information activity to foresee a surprise (for 
example: attacks of 11th September 2001, Indian nuclear test in 1998) reveals 
the importance to be attached to the same extent, strategic assumptions and 
estimates based on technical indications, the occurrence of minimum tactics 
indicators which enter at discrepancy with strategic assumptions being able to 
point out a possible surprise. 
 
In terms of structure, analysis activity involves both support 
management decision taking at the leadership level, by making available to 
beneficiaries of products designed to substantiate the adoption and effective 
implementation of measures to promote national interests. 
There are many forms in which information activity is done to inform 
beneficiaries, but most often support remained, despite technological developments, 
paper. There are few services (especially in Anglo-Saxon system) currently practice 
direct networking between producer („briefer”) and consumer (makers of state). 
Some analysts believe that the consumer should be careful to catch between 
the moments when he’s willing to listen and when he’s going to take a decision. 
Beneficiaries have been and won’t be interesting (for example, ex-president of 
Unites States, Jimmy Carter) to show importance to the intelligence products and 
do not count them. That doesn’t mean they are good or bad politicians. 
Beyond the concrete forms of development of this relationship is important to 
build a real partnership based on mutual trust between producer and consumer, 
allowing the quick and accurate knowledge of the needs of the consumer and 
capture of relevant reactions so useful for planning the intelligence activities, but 
also understanding the strength and limits of this kind of activity. 
 
„So, only through a partnership between producers and consumers, often difficult 
and tortuous one which always must be validated, supported and defended can intelligence 
define in an effective way those competitive advantages so much needed in strategic 
knowledge, the only can decide a victory or failure of the state in security field”21. 
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From relation perspective, a reform in the field of intelligence analysis 
need to aim at the imperative of adaptation of analytic product both consumers 
needs and its security agenda to its physiological profile. The implementation of 
various methods such as neuro linguistic programming or distance personality 
study can be extremely useful for adequacy of the message to the beneficiary profile. 
There are necessary to be implemented clear standards and high 
exigencies both in ensuring objectivity and credibility of analytical products, 
and in editing them. These must be two-ply by various auditing and evaluations 
mechanisms of intelligence products, which can offer monthly rigorous internal 
perspective about possible errors or efficiency of informing action.  
The role of intelligence consumer within the information cycle is very 
important, assuring the efficiency of the activity of national security. In this 
respect, one might prospect various typologies of settling the relationship 
between the producer and the consumer as well as getting the feed-back 
(allowing permanent adjustments of information’s gathering and analysis). 
Intelligence structures have to empathize. This means that they have to 
put themselves in interlocutor’s shoes (the consumer’s shoes), to identify their 
needs (justified needs, related to national security objectives and matching the 
legal attributions) and to try to accomplish them. 
The empathy and the fair attitude and the relation between the producer 
and the consumer (natural in democracy) suppose that the producer tries to 
persuade the consumer, knowing or his/hers needs or supposing his/hers 
misinterpretations or difficulties, understanding his/hers legal, political and 
public agenda’s boundaries and knowing, as well, the producer and consumer’s 
limits, originated in their human condition.  
As a former analyst said (one of the few who had the opportunity to 
become, after a while, beneficiary): “we have to understand that we all make 
mistakes”. We admit so easily the idea that our predecessors were wrong, and 
history is full of accepted errors (producers and consumers of intelligence), but 
we do not except that, maybe in this moment, it is possible that someone make 
mistakes (in an intelligence product) or a beneficiary (adopting to certain decisions) 
It is possible that now (when you read these lines) an analyst commits an 
understanding error or a decedent assumes, today, several decisions, including 
one to be wrong or to generate perverse effects (unplanned) in future. 
 
 
Guiding Points for Developing an Analytical Culture within the 
Intelligence Community in Romania 
 
● One of the aims of any project for changes within the intelligence 
analysis domain should be the development of an analytical culture in the 
national intelligence community, in order to implement measures that generate 
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added-value in the products and process of analysis, as well as the enhancement 
the professional training level of analysts.  
The development of an analytical culture needs certainly time, given to 
the fact that in the most part of the post-communist period the main institutional 
objective were targeting to products (intelligence activity outcomes) and not to 
processes and much less to personnel. According to Treverton, the analysts 
should become a dynamic for changing, working successively in other security 
agencies, employing personnel from outside and organizing brainstorming with 
personnel as routine actions, not as an exception. “They should spend time 
outside not in their offices, sharing assessments with other experts and verifying 
their agendas with decision makers”22. 
Adjusting the analytical component of the intelligence process to the 
security environment changes requires development of an analytical culture on 
three levels:  
– at individually level, through reshaping the training and developing 
programs and attending courses / change of experience with other 
structures of the security national system, foreign services and 
academic environment. 
Valorizing the potential and developing new competencies and skills of 
analysts require a coherent program for carrier developing that resulted 
in well-shaped character of some stages as initializing, training, and 
permanent development;  
– at institutionally (organizationally) level, through reshaping the current 
practices in the intelligence analysis domain, as well as developing an 
analytical culture. In this domain, a critical area is represented by 
developing mechanisms and assimilating the outcomes of some 
processes and lessons learned that draw out the needs of changing 
through assessing the previous errors and mistakes;  
– with regard to the external environment, through: supporting the 
analysts’ attendance both as observers and as lecturers at activities, 
courses, programs conducted by the academic and scientific community; 
encouraging the analysts’ attendance at change of experience with their 
counterparts in the foreign partner services, community or Euro-Atlantic 
security organizations, symposiums, seminars and other forums of 
foreign co-operations; developing the intra-institutional co-operation 
through flexible mechanisms of co-ordination and developing tools for 
timely communication between analysis and operational sectors.  
● Actually, “The 3 P Project” furthers, on one hand, a permanent 
adjusting of the intelligence analysis (on the three above-mentioned levels) in 
order to cope with the challenges in the security risks domain and, on the other 
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hand, to introduce scientifically confirmed tools in: the analytical process 
(methods and techniques from other disciplines), products (adjusting the 
message to the beneficiary’s profile and the consumers’ profile too) and the 
personnel selection and training process. 
As for the analytical managers (on different levels) (subject non-
approached in this dissertation), I consider they should be permanent focused on 
the improvement of the performances from the prospective of the three key 
factors and they should advance from the stance of delivering analytical 
products to supplying knowledge one. They are not leaders (heads) of 
departments any more, but also of knowledge. Their authority will be lesser and 
lesser formal and bureaucratic and increasingly anticipative and informal. They 
should not indicate the way to do but the way forward of the structures and 
personnel they lead by.  
They should encourage the dynamic forms of organization and ensure the 
transition from the hierarchical rigid structures to flexible working groups, since 
the modern intelligence services are lesser pyramidal and increasingly 
“network-centric” type23. Any intelligence analytical manager should stop his 
current activity to prospect his future and to encourage other individuals to act 
for reaching the “future” desirable persons.  
● Any reforming, adjusting plan, etc. should be developed to meet the 
future or “futures”, since is more and more difficult to anticipate what the future 
day will bring us. 
 
„In a world of uncertainties, the intelligence structures are not relying exclusively 
on the former succeeding strategies to project the future strategies.”24 
 
World is changing, from an essentially (quantifiably, visibly) threatening 
one – to one dominated by (diffuse, formless, with lesser predictable developed) 
risks and surprises (impossible to anticipate); from classical wars to cyber, 
economic, cognitive ones; from linear, predictable, quantifiable developments 
to non-linear, accidentally, diffuse ones, from symmetry to multiple 
asymmetries. Surprises, known in the specialty literature as “black swans”, will 
be increasingly present in our life.  
The event “black swan” has three attributes: is an isolated case, “beyond 
the usual current expectations” since in the past nothing indicated the possibility 
to occur it; has a significant impact and “retrospective (not inclusively 
prospective) predictability” that allow us to explain it after its occurring25. 
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We already face with a real tsunami in the information technology 
domain (it is not an accident that the Romanian Intelligence Service named its 
strategic vision on 2011-2015 “SRI in the informational era”). Who anticipated 
wikileaks event? And the “explosion” of the socializing networks? The 
facebook, twitter enhancing and their use not only socializing but also targeting 
the political area (see the facebook effect on young people in MENA or “twitter 
revolution” in the Republic of Moldova) will result in reshaping the social 
theories. Who thinks that these spontaneous, un-structured and virtual forms of 
association without obvious political aims, without registered office, without 
leaders and political platforms form could become non-State significant actors 
in the sociological or international relationship theories? The influence of an 
idea or an objective posted on facebook could be stronger that the one promoted 
by a State institution. Internet intends to replace the written media and soon the 
audio and video ones.  
Betts states that intelligence is a domain in which the fail is unavoidable, 
as the planning of resources and data collecting is realizable only on the current 
priorities and not on the future ones. Automatically, the intelligence agencies 
focus their efforts only on the current risks and not on the future ones that 
always led to the strategic surprises26. 
This is the reason we should change the approaching way, to see reality 
from many angles (perspectives). We should train our analysts for better facing 
the future (not current) risks. We should introduce the scenario analysis and 
simulations in the intelligence analysis (several federal Agencies in US use 
simulation analytical scenario) as standard procedures in the current activities. 
The future is of the futurologists, if they will be integrated in analysts’ 
teams and is also of the SF authors, film directors and scenarist whose opinion 
should be periodically asked by analysts.  
● Besides, at the national security level, forms of inventorying the 
(probable, improbable) “futures” should be invented. Although the national 
security is not only a responsibility of certain State institutions but also of the 
entire society (it is a common assess) and certain domestic vulnerabilities 
(duplicated by probable errors or lacking of some decisions) and the 
development of the security environment equally influent the State, society, the 
citizen. In Romania the resilience concept is not operational. The resilience 
should be part of the Country National Defense Strategy and transpose in 
modalities of post-event acting, with very clear implementing procedures, 
which allow an immediately intervention (any second of delay could resulted in 
multiplication the consequences).  
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I don’t want to conclude in a pessimistic tone, but it is necessary to 
mention I attended many international conferences and symposiums. In those 
situations, at the same table there are: State (governmental and parliamentary) 
institutions, intelligence services, NOGs, academics / scientists and persons 
from the security private area. In Romania, this situation is difficult to image as 
possibility. The international traditions or vanity determine us to work “with us 
and for us”. We live in a suspicious, apprehensive, anxious society that is 
fighting the future (or, anyway, it do not intend to shape, develop the future) 
and its (often unpredictable) consequences implicitly. The future is uncertain as 
it is a development of self interests.  
We do not determine what will be our image or what will make over 
20-30 years (by the way, we have no significant study regarding the future 
image of Romania in 20-30 years), in order plan influencing that future: to 
already invest in research, education, infrastructure, etc.  
In the political programs and security strategies in Romania, since 1990 to 
present, there is no word “future”. Therefore, it is no thinking or interest with 
this specificity. We have not courses of strategic thinking for civil servants and 
we have not think-tanks specialized in national security. Probably, this is the 
moment for planning that infrastructure to ensure the desired future.  
 
